Cservák Csaba: Types of Nationalities and Their Brief History in Hungary

Nationalities have always played an important role in Hungary’s history, despite the fact that the Hungarian people, who gave the country its name, have always dominated. Today, the protection of nationalities in our country is particularly important because of the large number of Hungarians who have been forced to emigrate. The large Hungarian diaspora does not look back on many centuries of history. Perhaps the first time many Hungarians emigrated abroad, for example to Turkey and the United States of America, was after the 1848 War of Independence. It should be mentioned, though, that the Ottoman Empire had already deported many Hungarians as janissaries from the 1500s, some of whom were settled in Egypt. Research into the traces of the Hungarians who remained in the East after the conquest has recently intensified.

Which nationalities are particularly important to protect? This is a very difficult question to answer. At first glance, we would say that the most obvious need is probably to protect those nationalities that differ significantly from the dominant population of the state. Of course, the brutal oppression of black-skinned slaves springs to mind. However, this claim is disproved when we think of the conflicts between Serbs and Croats, Ukrainians and Russians, who are similar peoples in terms of origin and mother tongue.

Based on historical experience, many aspects of the protection of nationalities are worthy of further valuable research. Firstly, it involves the categorization of nationalities into several categories, somewhat similar to the categorization of churches. It should be emphasized that ‘stateless minorities’ may be the category most in need of protection because of their double disadvantage.

An interesting context for the future could be to look at the ‘double nationality’ status. In other words, an analysis of the sociological and, by extension, legal consequences of minority groups moving to a ‘third country’. Here we can think of the situation of Hungarian Gypsies in Romania, Slovakia or even Western Europe, or even the fate of Catalans and Basques, minorities in Spain, in the Americas.

A separate analysis could be made of the cost of protecting minorities if the head of state of a country is himself of national minority origin. This was the case, for example, with Rudolf Schuster in Slovakia, Klaus Johannis in Romania or Nicolas Sarkozy in France. But a very special case was the dictatorial government of Alfredo Stroessner, of German origin, in Paraguay. The status of Germans in Hungary is particularly strong, also because of the many former German-speaking rulers. Not only the Habsburgs should be highlighted, but also Sigismund of Luxembourg, who became the German-Roman Emperor as King of Hungary.

According to international legal classifications, national and ethnic minorities may be granted personal rights, collective rights and – the greatest benefit – autonomy.[1]

Autonomy itself can range from territorial to personal.[2] The legitimacy of the former arises especially where members of an ethnic minority are living together in a territorial block, forming the majority population there. While countries tend to show less reluctance in granting personal autonomy, the notion of territorial autonomy often causes strong aversion.

Examples for personal autonomy can be found in the legal status of Lapps in Sweden, of Danes, Sorbs and Frisians in Germany, of Russians in Latvia and Lithuania and – soon to be detailed – in the case of Hungary’s minorities.[3]

Regarding territorial autonomy, further differentiation can be made based on whether this autonomy is embedded into the administrative framework of the state itself. If this isn’t the case, success requires a great deal of flexibility and active tolerance on the county’s part. For the first category, examples include the Åland Islands in Finland, Corsica in France, as well as Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain. The second case entails, among many others, the Feröer-Islands in Denmark and 225 Native American communities in the USA.[4]

The new law in Hungary replaces the former terminology of ‘minority’ with „national minority”, due to previous resentment about the Roma community being referred to as an ethnic minority group, as opposed to national minorities with nations of their own. „National minority” intends to signify that the group in question receives its privileges not only because it constitutes a numerically inferior group within society, but also because it is valuable to the nation. This value is something unique and distinct from the majority population; the cultural nuances embodied by the identity, the language and the historical traditions of national minorities.[5] (That being said, any potential measures of positive discrimination are justified exactly by their low numbers. The disenfranchisement of the majority population, on the other hand, is thankfully almost nonexistent in our time. The very thought is frighteningly alien to the spirit of modern democracy and the rule of law; such as the cases of ancient Sparta and the South African Republic of last century.)

Although it rarely surfaces in public speech, international jurisprudence usually distinguishes three types of minorities:

    • those originally having belonged under the jurisdiction of one state, but annexation or border changes forced them under another,
    • the inhabitants of a given area before the state of the current majority was founded there, and lastly,
    • those who attained their citizenship after immigrating into the country.[6]

It goes without saying that in terms of personal rights, there can be no differentiation between individuals across these groups. When it comes to collective rights, however, further protection is necessary in the order of the list above, as justified by the more solidly formed identities of the former groups, not to mention their potential historical grievances, such as those of the Hungarians who found themselves outside the country’s current borders. While under a democratic rule of law, nobody may be discriminated against based on their ethnic origins, it is important to note that a state’s decision on which groups it favors with what benefits, particularly autonomy itself, remains a matter of efficiency and viability. (Jurisprudence could further diversify these categories, such as whether or not the home country of a national minority itself hosts a minority consisting of the other country’s compatriots. Under these terms, Hungarians and Romanians are effectively mutual minorities. It is also an important consideration whether a minority possesses a mother country at all, the lack of which necessitates even steadier protection.[7])

Regarding national minority rights, the author classifies them as either positive or negative rights. In this context, negative rights are understood as a lack of prohibition on the support a minority group can receive from its mother country. In the 21st century, it is unacceptable that possessing, for example, Hungarian citizenship would forfeit its bearer’s citizenship in the country of their residence. It should be a given, at least, that states refrain from restricting the ability of their national minorities in maintaining contact with their brethren. (We are given an interesting synthesis between the issuing of citizenship to compatriots living abroad and the protection of national minorities in a recent Spanish proposal that endeavors to grant favorable citizenship acquisition procedures to the descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled during the 16th century.[8])

Although it remains exceedingly hard to vindicate minority rights in an international context, a state’s willingness to provide and reinforce these rights beyond the bare minimum on its own initiative is a hallmark of its progressiveness.

The former Minority Act of Hungary stood on legal principles roughly identical to the current one. Accordingly, national minorities are

„all groups of people who have lived in the territory of Hungary for at least one century, who represent a numerical minority in the country’s population, whose members are Hungarian citizens, who are distinguished from the rest of the population by their own languages, cultures and traditions, who demonstrate a sense of belonging together that is aimed at preserving all of these and at expressing and protecting the interests of their historical communities”.[9]

The new legislation preserved the previously existing list of thirteen official minorities in its entirety, composed of the Bulgarian, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Roma, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovene and Ukrainian communities.[10] These national minorities enjoy full legal equality.[11] On the other hand, international treaties also created a group of so-called ‘chartal minorities’ in Hungary. This group includes the Croatian, German, Romanian, Serb, Slovak and Slovene minorities, as well as Gypsies speaking Romani or Boyash as their first language; their legal protection[12] being a result of the signing of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.[13] (This was extended in 2008 to include the Romani and Boyash languages.)[14]

The current law lists Bulgarian, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Roma/Gypsy (Romani and Boyash, hereinafter: Roma), Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Ukrainian as national minority languages. Within the Roma and the Armenian communities, the Hungarian language is also counted as such.[15]

Consequently – even though practice on the matter is less than consistent – we can distinguish between the protection of national minorities, and that of their languages. The law takes note of the fact that for many Roma and Armenians, Hungarian is their true mother language. (The question begs itself whether the possession of a distinct language can even be a requirement to being categorized as a national minority.)

The list is, of course, a relative one, but it certainly stands to reason that these thirteen national minority groups preserved the rights they formerly acquired. The inclusion of additional national minority groups is also a possibility. Taking into account our common historical traditions and values, one could rightfully ponder why Italians were ranked below the other thirteen in importance. Certain organizations – arguing for the general sympathy felt towards Hungary in many Turkic countries – suggested the possible inclusion of Turks as well. As is natural after a 150-year period of occupation, there are Hungarians with recognized Turkish ancestry. The previous law already allowed an ethnic group with at least a hundred-year presence and a thousand signatories to petition for official recognition as a national minority.[16] This was taken up on, for example, by the Italians[17], the Aegean Greeks and the Russians[18], and one group even purported to be Huns while issuing the request.[19] Realization was met with difficulties, however; illustrating the point that the popular initiation of the process isn’t nearly as effective as outright legal codification through parliament. (In the absence of this hundred-year requirement, even the Chinese could step up with a claim.[20] The question is: where do we draw the line in the name of efficiency?)

The choice of which ethnic group to imbue with the recognition and protection of the law is a difficult one. To illustrate that, let us put forth a number of rhetorical questions. What is the main distinguishing factor between the already recognized national minorities and the rest of them listed above? The number of citizens identifying themselves with them? It is worth noting here that in this regard, different cultures present different attitudes. (For instance, whether it’s important for someone to be German, or it’s merely a case of possessing a German surname.) Are we only to study the number of indigenous Poles, or do we also count those who immigrated in the past fifty years? Can we discriminate against Italians and Turks whose original populations are low, but recently received a significant boost?[21] For some, it is perhaps only their names (or a family legend) that reminds them of their origins[22], and even in the „Thirteen”, many might only have responded positively for the sake of the benefits provided by the national minority status. These questions all highlight the relative and nuanced nature of these categories.

To continue with the questions, can it be a deciding factor whether the mother country of a given ethnicity is/was bordering Hungary? Despite many centuries of neighborhood, Poland no longer falls into this category, and even Italy was once bordering the western reaches of the Kingdom of Hungary, with many joint rulers down the line.[23] Not only was Turkey a neighbor, it even annexed our current capital under Suleiman I. Which brings us to our next point: can it possess any relevance whether the role of a given people has been positive in our history? Can we distinguish based on this? This is also a highly relative matter, especially since contemporary foreign affairs may suddenly boost the importance of any country significantly. Let us add that the role of our current neighbours also wasn’t always a positive one, but we must look forward, not backward. To summarize: based on the above, it is the claims of Italians and Turks that would especially merit acknowledgement.

After the fall of Communism, the participation of minorities in public affairs, as guaranteed by the Constitution, was intended to be realized in the form of a collective ombudsman, into which all thirteen minorities were to delegate one representative. Later, political speech effectively washed together representation in public affairs with political representation, constantly stressing its need and importance. Parallel to this, an ombudsman responsible for minority affairs was created.[24] The holder of this office was nominated by the president and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in parliament. In practice, however, different interpretations on certain fundamental rights kept occurring between the general ombudsman and the minority affairs ombudsman regarding grievances issued by minority citizens. (It is difficult enough to ascertain whether these offences even happened due to their ethnic origins.) Under the aegis of the new Fundamental Law, the office of the ombudsman became monocratic („one-headed”).[25] This brings it under a unified direction, with the role of a separate minority affairs ombudsman being taken over by a deputy nominated by the singular ombudsman himself and confirmed, as before, through a two-thirds parliamentary vote. This deputy commissioner of fundamental rights is responsible for the legal protection of national minorities living in Hungary, monitoring their situation, guaranteeing their rights and taking all measures prescribed by law. In the event that the deputy possesses a degree of independence – the Hungarian law currently in effect allows for this – this model is well-suited to provide efficient legal protection for national minorities. (We can add here that even though the situation of Hungarians living there would strongly justify it, neither the Slovakian, nor the Romanian constitution has yet created such an institution.[26])

In one of his previous publications, the author of this work suggested the inclusion of minorities in a theoretical second chamber of parliament, with a serious role to play there.[27]

Bibliography

Barcy Zoltán – Somogyi Győző: Magyar huszárok, Budapest, Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó, 1987.

Bindorffer Györgyi: Kisebbség, politika, kisebbségpolitika – Nemzeti és etnikai közösségek kisebbségi önkormányzati autonómiája Magyarországon, Budapest, Gondolat– MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2011.

Cservák Csaba: Az ombudsmantól az Alkotmánybíróságig – Az alapvető jogok védelmének rendszere, Debrecen, Lícium-Art, 2013.

Cservák Csaba: Kormányzati és választási rendszer (avagy demokratikus hatalomgyakorlás komplex rendszere nemzetközi kitekintésben), PhD értekezés, SZTE-ÁJK, 2010.

Domonkos Endre: Nemzetközi autonómia-modellek és kisebbségi kérdés, A katalán regionális autonómia és tapasztalatai, PhD. értekezés, Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, 2010.

Draskóczy István: Minorities in Hungary in the Árpád-age, Kisebbségkutatás, 2000/9.

Fábián Gyula – Ötvös Patrícia: Kisebbségi jog, I. kötet, Kolozsvár, Komp-press korunk baráti társaság, 2003.

Fejes Zsuzsanna: Határok nélkül? A határon átnyúló együttműködések jogi és közigazgatási környezete Európában és Magyarországon, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2013.

Fejes Zsuzsanna: Határtalan lehetőségek: az együttműködés jogi feltételei a magyar-román-szerb hármashatár mentén, in Soós Edit – Fejes Zsuzsanna (szerk.): Régió a hármashatár mentén, Szeged, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2010.

Majtényi Balázs: Nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok, in Jakab András: Az Alkotmány kommentárja, Budapest, Századvég Kiadó, 2009.

Szabadfalvi József: Nemzetállam és szuverenitás, in Takács Péter (szerk.): Államelmélet, Miskolc, Bíbor Kiadó, 1997.

Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet: A kisebbségvédelem nemzetközi jogi intézményrendszere a 20. században, Gondolat – MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Budapest 2003.

Other sources

2011. évi népszámlálás, 9. nemzetiségi adatok, Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2014, http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_09_2011.pdf

Szefárd zsidók leszármazottai spanyol állampolgárok lehetnek, hirado.hu, 2014. február 9. http://www.hirado.hu/2014/02/09/szefard-zsidok-leszarmazottai-spanyol-allampolgarok-lehetnek/

References

  1. Although there used to be historical periods when the collective aspects of national minority law were completely marginalised. See: Fábián Gyula – Ötvös Patrícia: Kisebbségi jog, I. kötet, Kolozsvár, Komp-press korunk baráti társaság, 2003, 35.
  2. See: Domonkos Endre: Nemzetközi autonómia-modellek és kisebbségi kérdés, A katalán regionális autonómia és tapasztalatai, PhD. értekezés, Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, 2010, 24–25.
  3. Domonkos: Nemzetközi autonómia-modellek, 34–37.
  4. Domonkos: Nemzetközi autonómia-modellek, 31–33.
  5. See: Act CLXXIX of 2011, Section 1, Subsection (1).
  6. Szabadfalvi József: Nemzetállam és szuverenitás, in Takács Péter (szerk.): Államelmélet, Miskolc, Bíbor Kiadó, 1997, 137.
  7. The external support of national minorities can naturally be amplified by way of heavy cooperation with their mother country. This is at its most efficient when the two countries border each other. See: Fejes Zsuzsanna: Határok nélkül? A határon átnyúló együttműködések jogi és közigazgatási környezete Európában és Magyarországon, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2013, 239. and Fejes Zsuzsanna: Határtalan lehetőségek: az együttműködés jogi feltételei a magyar-román-szerb hármashatár mentén, in Soós Edit – Fejes Zsuzsanna (szerk.): Régió a hármashatár mentén, Szeged, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2010, 103–118.
  8. This proposal ended up being active legislation. See: Szefárd zsidók leszármazottai spanyol állampolgárok lehetnek, hirado.hu, 2014. február 9. http://www.hirado.hu/2014/02/09/szefard-zsidok-leszarmazottai-spanyol-allampolgarok-lehetnek/
  9. See: Act CLXXIX of 2011, Section 1, Subsection (1).
  10. See: Act CLXXIX of 2011, Appendix 1.
  11. As a curiosity, a Ministry of Interior draft in 1992 – while leaving the rest of them in a status similar to the current one – intended to classify Gypsies, Armenians and Jews as ethnic, rather than national minorities, with less numerous privileges. This was met with great outrage and the Jewish community – upon its own request – ended up being deemed a religious, rather than a national minority. (See: multiple chapters of Bindorffer Györgyi: Kisebbség, politika, kisebbségpolitika – Nemzeti és etnikai közösségek kisebbségi önkormányzati autonómiája Magyarországon, Budapest, Gondolat– MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2011.)
  12. Further reading on the role of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in the international system of minority protection: Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet: A kisebbségvédelem nemzetközi jogi intézményrendszere a 20. században, Gondolat – MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Budapest 2003.
  13. See: Act XL of 1999, Section 3.
  14. See: Act XLIII of 2008, Section 3.
  15. See: Act CLXXIX of 2011, Section 22, Subsection (1).
  16. See: Act LXXVII of 1993, Section 148, Subsection (3).
  17. Although the Italians were granted the National Electoral Commission’s (OVB) permission in January 2008, they were unable to collect the minimum amount of signatures necessary on time. See: http://www.nvi.hu/nepszav08/ovb/hu/osszefoglalok/20080825.pdf
  18. The Russian request foundered on formalities, because despite being mandated to do so by law, the National Electoral Commission neglected to formally request the opinion of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Majtényi Balázs: Nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok, in Jakab András: Az Alkotmány kommentárja, Budapest, Századvég Kiadó, 2009, 2408–2412.
  19. See: Resolution 32/2005. (IV. 27.).
  20. Interestingly, after helping to crush the Boxer Rebellion in 1901, the Austro-Hungarian Empire managed to acquire a concession of roughly a hundred hectares in the city of Tianjin, thus creating a „quasi-colony” with about 25,000 Chinese locals.
  21. It is even less justified to exclude the Turkish and Italian people from the list of beneficiaries based on population data. Taking into account recent arrivals, some of the established national minorities already fall into comparative numerical inferiority (see: 2011. évi népszámlálás, 9. nemzetiségi adatok, Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2014, http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_09_2011.pdf
  22. There are many Hungarians with Italian names, including notable jurists and composers. A few families also cultivate their Turkish roots from Ottoman times. The family of light cavalry lieutenant general Ferenc Czungenberg, originating from Csonka Bey, is but one of the many examples. See: Barcy Zoltán – Somogyi Győző: Magyar huszárok, Budapest, Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó, 1987, 26.
  23. „Almost immediately after the birth of the Kingdom of Hungary, settlers (called hospes in Latin) started pouring in from the west continuously. A testament to their early presence is 35 settlement names with the Németi- prefix (meaning German) and 8 with Olaszi- (Italian), originating from the 11th and 12th centuries. They were dispersed around the country, depending on when they arrived and where they were needed. The newcomers were Germans, Italians (which, under medieval terminology, also included Walloons) Czechs, Poles and other neighboring peoples. Most of them were farmers, but merchants also arrived in plentiful numbers. It was the latter group that came to form the core of the newly founded cities.Among the more minor groups were those Italians that came to the Kingdom of Hungary to participate in trade and other financial matters during the 14th and 15th centuries. (During this era, Italians were living in virtually every country in Europe.) In 1402, the Italian community in Buda supported Ladislaus of Naples over Sigismund of Luxemburg during their succession conflict, for which the victorious Sigismund cast many of them into prison. Local Germans exploited the opportunity and largely took over their chamber offices, allowing them to control the mining operations of gold, silver and copper. The Italians soon regained these posts, and from that point forward, these two groups alternately controlled the mines of Hungary.” See: Draskóczy István: Minorities in Hungary in the Árpád-age, Kisebbségkutatás, 2000/9.
  24. The office of the ombudsman of minority affairs was created by the Act on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in 1993 (Act LXXVII of 1993). According to this, the ombudsman of minority affairs was essentially subject to the same regulations as the general ombudsman (Act LIX of 1993). Because the election of the first minority affairs ombudsman required a two-thirds majority in parliament, it only came about in 1995, for various political reasons.
  25. See: The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 30, Section (1).
  26. See: Cservák Csaba: Az ombudsmantól az Alkotmánybíróságig – Az alapvető jogok védelmének rendszere, Debrecen, Lícium-Art, 2013, 5–48.
  27. See: Cservák Csaba: Kormányzati és választási rendszer (avagy demokratikus hatalomgyakorlás komplex rendszere nemzetközi kitekintésben), PhD értekezés, SZTE-ÁJK, 2010, 89–90.

 

Cservák Csaba: The historical constitution: a kind of unique legitimacy and a particular division of powers

The three basic types of legitimacy are traditional, charismatic, and rational legal. In the past, legitimacy of tradition was typical. Present days, the legitimacy of rationality is typical. The development of the Hungarian Historical Constitution was characterized by a kind of compromise between the two.

Although the theory of the distribution of power is a product of the Age of Enlightenment, its practical manifestation has been in existence for centuries. The divided power is necessarily restricted which is a prevention of the abuse of power and an institutionalized form of the protection against autocracy. Therefore, it is unequivocal that the real implementation of the distribution of power had been in the center of efforts, much before it was defined.

Contrary to popular belief, Montesquieu didn’t establish the classic three branches of powers, but Aristotle did so. He mentioned deliberative body of public affairs, magistrates and judiciary which – considering the complex role of the parliament – is completely equal to the trinity of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Politeia was declared as the appropriate structure of power which is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy.

Cicero, in his work The State, committed himself to such type of it in which there is an intermediate structure among the monarchy, the rule of aristocracy and the democracy. These two theories can be confidently regarded as a preliminary concept of the distribution of power, because the mixed state can only exist through the precise delimitation of the authority of various factors by involving them into the power in sociology-political sense.[1] Polybios went even further. His theories came up to the conclusions of the ’classical Greek philosophers’. According to his point of view, the different social forces must check and restrict each other, which adumbrates the system of ’checks and balances’.[2]

Beside the legislative and the executive powers John Locke mentions a third-one, the federal power. It can be regarded as the equivalent of the head of state power which is considered a factor of the government system and possess a role of foreign policy as well.[3]

The great oracle Montesquieu distinguishes the legislative power, the power which falls within the scope of international law and executive power related to civil law issues. The latter mentioned is the judicial power and the second mentioned is referring to the monarch/head of state power, which is eventually equal to the trinity-system of Locke’s. (It should be noted that in this era the depositary of the executive power was the monarch, or the administration appointed by him. In the absence of the welfare state, the principal executive tasks tended to the foreign policy.) As an affirmation Montesquieu separates the legislative power into a bicameral National Assembly.[4]

For several aspect in the theory of the distribution of power, it may be more appropriate to use the concept of the separation of the functions of power instead of the concept of the separation of powers. Because on one hand these patrons of the idea practically envisaged the separation of the function of legislative, executive and judicial powers among different bodies. They fought against the concentration of these three functions in one node, so that their aim was not the abolition of the relation of powers.

On the other hand, this proposed concept is more compatible to the system of checks and balances. Latter mentioned can not only be achieved through the rigid separation of constitutional factors, but also by their legally institutionalized relationship-system. The theory of Montesquieu underlying the distribution of powers is also based on this principle. An important factor of the balance is that the individual branches of power, is that one branch should not overpower the other ones, which is guaranteed by the system of authorities of the various bodies controlled by each other. For instance, the dismissal of the government and the potential of the dissolution of parliament. (By the motion of censure in the Hungarian government system and the exclusion of the dissolution of parliament could be mentioned as the distribution of powers, but it is not possible, because of the political identity in between the two concepts).

Let us briefly examine how specific the division of powers was in the system of the Hungarian historical constitution.

There is an interesting dichotomy between the Hungarian Historical Constitution and the former “province of Transylvania”. On the one hand, Transylvania was an inseparable part of the once-was Hungarian state. On the other hand, in the period of the “country torn into three parts” (1526-1686), according to some approaches, Transylvania embodied and represented the independent Hungarian state. Thus, a Hungary without Transylvania can no longer be a successor to the old Hungary. Because of this bifold relationship, we need to have a closer look at the Historic Constitution.

Hungary had a specific constitution: the Historical Constitution based on the Holy Crown.[5] According to this, the Holy Crown serves as the material embodiment of the supreme power of the state and sovereignty.[6] It is not only a symbolic carrier of those, but also provides the legit source from where the state’s supremacy stems. This is a very early appearance of the concept of the legal entity in European legal culture. In the Historical Constitution, moral standards played a major role.[7]

Historic constitutions are also commonly referred to as unwritten constitutions, as opposed to written constitutions, which form the other major category. In the former group, the constitution is not a single document but a collection of norms that are partly customary, and there is a public agreement between the state and its people that elevates them to a constitutional level (in this respect it is similar to the historical constitution of Great Britain, or New Zealand, which became an independent British colony). In case of the written constitutions, there can almost always be found a fundamental document which was intended to be a constitution at the time of its creation.

The historical constitution contains moral and logical principles of popular reasoning which are the limits of future legislation. They cannot be changed, amended, and if they were to be changed, it would have to be explicitly declared that this or that guiding principle is now inapplicable.

The idea of the continuity of law is also intertwined with the Holy Crown. In other words, existing legislation can only be amended in accordance with the rules already in force.

The crown expresses abstract supreme power separate from the king’s personal one, and therefore the monarch cannot privately own the country (This was a highly developed abstraction in the context of patrimonial-feudal medieval thinking!) The king does not exercise power alone, but together with the noblemen – so we can observe the germ of the principle of popular sovereignty in this context.

The historical constitution is not a sign of ossified conservatism, but it also contains the potential for change, but only allows for organic, continuous development that is in accordance with its own rules. The principles of the historical constitution, which can be traced back to the feudal era and even to the blood oath, thus corresponded to the idea of the state in the bourgeois era. The ‘liberty of the one and equal noblemen ship’ declared in 1351 was an early manifestation of non-discrimination.

The reforms of April 1848 did not abolish this, but rather extended it.[8] The serfs and the bourgeoisie – the first group had been previously oppressed and the latter one which had undergone anemic development -, were brought into power. They did not take away the rights of the privileged but gave privileges to virtually all citizens. But the core of the ancient constitution, its logical-ethical inner basis, remained unchanged. They did not even try to change it, but proudly referred to its timelessness and almost eternal characteristic.

For almost a millennium, Hungary’s form of government was a kingdom headed by a king. However, unlike many medieval states, the power of the monarch was controlled from very early on by what is now called ‘checks and balances’, and the parliament played a significant role in law-making from very early on. The king could only rule once he had been crowned and had accepted the constitutional conditions at the same time as the ceremony. Compared with other states of the time, the powers of the Hungarian Parliament were broader than those of the other states of the time.[9] The development of the legal status and administration of the various ‘bordering provinces’, however, took interesting turns very early on.

The Transylvanian princes, in their treaties with the Hungarian king, repeatedly acknowledged their obligation not to alienate parts of their possessions in order to protect the territory of the Holy Crown, and declared that Transylvania was an inalienable part of the Hungarian Crown.[10] The Treaty of Speyer, signed on 16 August 1570 by Maximilian and Janos Zsigmond, stated that ‘…nothing of the property that the sovereign prince holds of the crown of the country shall be alienated, although he and his successors shall be free to mortgage or pledge it to the benefit of others if necessary (retaining the clause prohibiting perpetual alienation.)’ ‘Neither Transylvania, nor any other counties long since subordinate to it, nor their castles or fortifications be alienated from the crown of Hungary other than as it now possessed’ – declares a similar agreement between Gábor Báthori and Matthias II.[11]

The most important guiding principle of the historical Hungarian constitution was the Doctrine of the Holy Crown. Under its aegis, the backbone of the nation was made up jointly by king and nobility. In other words, the king does not rule; the crown does. (This can be understood as an early prototype of the separation of powers.) As a consequence, legally speaking, the king did not own his country as private property. It is to be noted that de iure, Hungary and Bohemia were frequently in personal union. This spurred Wenceslaus III, King of Bohemia and one of the pretenders for the Hungarian throne of the eventually triumphant Charles Robert of Anjou to lay claim to parts of the country.[12]

Sigismund of Luxemburg was elected Holy Roman Emperor as the king of both Hungary and Bohemia, with later shared rulers of these countries usually inheriting both titles simultaneously. Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458-1490) occupied parts of Bohemia and declared himself king of that country, but de iure, Bohemia remained intact as an independent entity. The Jagiellonian kings of Hungary (Vladislaus II and Louis II) also reigned in Bohemia, thereby holding both titles themselves. In 1526, Hungary broke into three parts.[13] The legitimate successors to the Kingdom of Hungary became the House of Habsburg, who also constantly bore the title of Bohemian kings. Upon the outbreak of Rákóczi’s War of Independence, Francis II Rákóczi was elected ruling prince. Even though his forces occupied a significant portion of the country, the Habsburgs still considered themselves its heads of state.[14]

For a short time after the dethronal of the House of Habsburg during the War for Independence of 1849, Lajos Kossuth was exercising the power of the head of state (and, in practice, the head of government) as Governor-President in which amounted to a presidential state model. After crushing the revolution and before being compelled by historical circumstances to sign the Austro-Hungarian Gerat Compromise of 1867, the Habsburgs a military dictatorship. The Gerat Compromise created a real union between Austria and Hungary.[15] Interestingly, despite its historical role and economic importance, Bohemia was not made an equivalent constituent state of the Empire. It begs the question whether a triadic rather than a dualistic state model would have proven more durable in withstanding the storms of history looming ahead…

During the period following defeat in WWI, forms of government in Hungary followed one another as rapidly as the coups d’état that brought them about. Initially, Mihály Károlyi became president of the republic in what was intended to be a parliamentary system, followed by the 133 days of dictatorship by the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Upon the fall of the latter, the powers of head of state were taken over by Rear admiral Miklós Horthy, elected on March 1st, 1920, as Governor of Hungary. His jurisdiction was continuously extended, and his mandate was life-long. As his legal powers over the parliament strengthened, he gained the ability to return legislation for deliberation and was granted the right to dissolve the government. He could also nominate members (more and more of them) to the second chamber of parliament. His legal powers were a peculiar “alloy” between those of a semi-presidential president and a constitutional monarch. Horthy even attempted to pass on his powers via dynastic succession. He had his own son elected Deputy Governor who, upon meeting certain criteria, would have been able to take over the office of Governor after the death of the head of state.[16] Following WWII, Act I of 1946 was accepted. Even though it was referred to by many in later times as a ‘Little Constitution’, it did not explicitly declare a form of government despite reinstituting the office of president of the republic.

To summarize, we can say the following. The Holy Crown is the transfigured depository of Hungarian royal power. All powers derive from the Crown. The members of the Holy Crown are Hungarian citizens with full rights, i.e., the noblemen.

Bibliography

Arató Balázs: Az osztrák-magyar „álladalomról”, in Lajos Edina (ed.): Alkotmányosság a pandémia korszakában, Lícium-Art, Debrecen, 2021.

Balogh Elemér: Alkotmányunk történetisége, kitekintéssel az Alkotmánybíróság judikatúrájára, in Balogh Elemér (ed.): Számadás az Alaptörvényről, Magyar Közlöny, Budapest, 2016.

Bölöny József: Történelmi alkotmányunk és az 1848-as fejlődés. M. Közig., Budapest, 1941.

Horváth Attila: A Szent Korona-tan története, in Arató Balázs. (ed.): Jogalkotási tükör 2010–2018, Patrocinium, Budapest, 2018.

Lajos Edina: A jog és erkölcs összefüggésének alapjai, KRE-DIt, 2023/1.

Lajos Edina: A Szent Korona és a legitimáció, KRE-DIt, 2023/1.

Máthé Gábor: Die Problematik der Gewaltentrennung, Gondolat Verl., Budapest, 2004.

Sári János: A hatalommegosztás, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1995.

Szilágyi Sándor (ed): Erdélyi Országgyűlési Emlékek, VI. (1608-1614), Budapest, 1880.

Sakmyster, Thomas: Admirális fehér lovon, Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. (Original title: Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918-1944.)

Zetényi Zsolt: A történeti alkotmány. Magyarországért Kulturális Egyesület, Budapest, 2009.

References

  1. See. Sári János: A hatalommegosztás, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1995, 19–21. (Hungarian)
  2. János Sári mentioned that after, Sabine és Louis Fisher insights. See Sári: Hatalommegosztás, 18.
  3. See Sári: Hatalommegosztás, 30–34.; Máthé Gábor: Die Problematik der Gewaltentrennung, Gondolat Verl., Budapest, 2004, 15–64.
  4. See Sári: Hatalommegosztás, 37–40.
  5. See Balogh Elemér: Alkotmányunk történetisége, kitekintéssel az Alkotmánybíróság judikatúrájára, in Balogh Elemér (ed.): Számadás az Alaptörvényről, Magyar Közlöny, Budapest, 2016, 541–543.
  6. Lajos Edina: A Szent Korona és a legitimáció, KRE-DIt, 2023/1, 169–175. (Hungarian)
  7. Lajos Edina: A jog és erkölcs összefüggésének alapjai, KRE-DIt, 2023/1, 164–169. (Hungarian)
  8. Bölöny József: Történelmi alkotmányunk és az 1848-as fejlődés. M. Közig., Budapest, 1941, 16. (Hungarian)
  9. Zetényi Zsolt: A történeti alkotmány. Magyarországért Kulturális Egyesület, Budapest, 2009, 54. (Hungarian)
  10. Horváth Attila: A Szent Korona-tan története, in Arató Balázs. (ed.): Jogalkotási tükör 2010–2018, Patrocinium, Budapest, 2018, 45–70. (Hungarian)
  11. Szilágyi Sándor (ed): Erdélyi Országgyűlési Emlékek, VI. (1608-1614), Budapest, 1880, 269. (Hungarian)
  12. In Hungary, he reigned as Wenceslaus I, while in his native Bohemia (following the death of his father, Wenceslaus II), he was known, between 1305 and 1306, as Wenceslaus III.
  13. A significant portion of the country was occupied by the Ottoman Empire, while the Principality of Transylvania practically functioned as a ‘second Hungary’.
  14. Leopold I (1657-1705), Joseph I (1705-1711) and Charles III (1711-1740). It is to be noted that the latter was also known as Charles II as King of Bohemia and Charles VI as Holy Roman Emperor.
  15. Arató Balázs: Az osztrák-magyar „álladalomról”, in Lajos Edina (ed.): Alkotmányosság a pandémia korszakában, Lícium-Art, Debrecen, 2021, 99–104. (Hungarian)
  16. See: Thomas Sakmyster: Admirális fehér lovon, Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2001, 255. (Hungarian) (Original title: Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918-1944.)

 

Cservák Csaba: A történeti alkotmányosság és a főispáni tisztség

Magyarországnak évszázadokig volt egy – máig ható – alkotmánya: a Szent Korona-tanon alapuló Történeti Alkotmány.[1] (Más terminológiával Történelmi Alkotmány. Az utóbbit – a régi használat után – kezdi újra felfedezni a tudomány. A történet ugyanis csak események egymás utánisága, a történelem szóban pedig benne foglaltatik a logikus összefüggésrendszer és értéktartalom is.) Eszerint a Szent Korona az államhatalom és a szuverenitás tárgyiasult megtestesítője. Nem csak jelképes hordozója, hanem áttételesen kútforrása is. A jogi személy fogalmi konstrukciójának igen korai megjelenése ez az európai jogi kultúrában.

A történeti alkotmányokat szokás íratlan alkotmányoknak is nevezni, szemben a másik nagy kategóriát jelentő írott alkotmányokkal. Az előbbi csoportnál az alkotmány nem egyetlen dokumentumból áll, normái részben szokásjogiak, a közmegegyezés emeli azokat alkotmányos rangúvá. (Ebben hasonlít Nagy-Britannia történeti alkotmányához, illetőleg az angol gyarmatként önállósult Új-Zélandhoz.) Ki kell emelnünk e tekintetben a magyar jogfejlődésben a sarkalatos törvényeket, mely kör megállapítása nem teljesen vitán felül álló. Az írott alkotmányok esetében létezik egy alapvető dokumentum, amelyet már megalkotásakor is alkotmánynak szántak.

A Történeti Alkotmány magában hordoz olyan erkölcsi, a nép józan gondolkodásában rejlő logikai elveket, melyek korlátként állnak a jövendő jogszabályalkotás fölött. Nem is megváltoztathatóak, illetőleg esetleges megváltoztatásuk esetén kifejezetten deklarálni kellene, hogy ez vagy az a vezérelv valamiért innentől hatálytalan.

A Szent Korona-tannal összeforrt a jogfolytonosság eszméje is. Jelesül: a hatályos jogszabályokat csak a már meglévő szabályok szerint lehet folyamatosan módosítani.[2]

A korona a király személyétől elkülönítetten fejezi ki az elvont államhatalmat, ennél fogva az uralkodó nem tekintheti magánjogi értelemben sajátjának az országot. (Ez a patrimoniális-feudális középkori gondolkodás közepette egy igen fejlett absztrakciós megoldás volt, és a jogállamiság elméleti megalapozásának sajátos magyar megoldását jelentette.) A király nem egyedül, hanem a nemességgel együtt gyakorolja a hatalmat – a népszuverenitás elvének csírájára figyelhetünk fel ennek kapcsán.[3] A királyi hatalom és a rendiség egyetlen, elválaszthatatlan államhatalmi tényezőben, a Szent Koronában, egyesült és olvadt össze.[4] Ezen eszme tehát igen korszerűnek számított egyéb európai államokkal összevetve, így büszkeségre ad okot a hagyományokhoz hű magyarságnak.

A Történeti Alkotmány nem a megcsontosodott konzervativizmus közjele, hanem magában hordozza a változás lehetőségeit is, de csak szerves, folyamatos, önmaga szabályait betartó fejlődést tesz lehetővé. A feudális korszakig, sőt a vérszerződésig visszavezethető Történeti Alkotmány elvrendszere így megfelelt a polgári korszak állameszméjének is. Az „egy és azonos nemesei szabadság” 1351-ben deklarált tétele a diszkrimináció-mentesség korai megnyilvánulása volt. Az 1848-as áprilisi reformok ezt nem eltörölték, hanem éppenhogy kiterjesztették.[5] A korábban elnyomott jobbágyságot és a vérszegény fejlődésen keresztülment polgárságot ugyanis – ahogy akkor fogalmaztak – mintegy beemelték a hatalom sáncaiba. Nem a kiváltságosok jogait vették el, hanem a kiváltságokban részeltettek minden állampolgárt. De az ősi alkotmány magköve, logikai-erkölcsi belső alapja nem változott. Nem is próbálták megváltoztatni, sőt, büszkén hivatkoztak annak időtálló, szinte örök jellegére.

Magyarország államformája szinte egy évezreden keresztül királyság volt, élén a királlyal. Az uralkodó hatalma azonban már igen korán – szemben számos középkori állammal – mai szóval „fékekkel és egyensúlyokkal” volt kontrollálva, a törvényhozás terén a parlamentnek igen régóta jelentős szerepe volt. A király csak onnantól uralkodhatott, hogy megkoronázták és e szertartással egyidejűleg az alkotmányos feltételeket elfogadta. A magyar Országgyűlés hatáskörei az uralkodó irányában – a korabeli államokkal összevetve – tágabbak voltak. Tehát a hatalommegosztás eszménye hazánkban dicséretesen korán megnyilvánult.

Egy terminológiai vita dúl a tekintetben, hogy alkotmánynak nevezhető-e a sztálini indíttatású 1949. évi XX. törvény. A Történeti Alkotmány és a jogfolytonosság hitvallói rendszeresen kiemelik, hogy – mivel hazánknak volt alkotmánya és azt senki nem helyez(het)te hatályon kívül – a vitatott jogszabály legföljebb alaptörvénynek nevezhető. Az azonban mindkét esetben egyértelmű, hogy létezik a „legfelső írott jogszabály” fölött egy olyan norma, melyet egy oktrojált parlamenti tollvonással nem lehet egyszerűen félre tenni. (Mint ahogy ma is létezik alkotmányunk, mely tág értelemben – egyes értelmezések szerint – magában foglalja az Alaptörvény mellett többek között a Történelmi Alkotmány vívmányait és az Alkotmánybíróság értelmező döntéseit.)

Mindazonáltal a szerves fejlődésen keresztülment történeti alkotmányt egy illegitim parlament fogalmilag kizárt, hogy hatályon kívül helyezze. Az 1949. évi XX. törvényt egy antidemokratikus választójogi törvény antidemokratikus végrehajtásával megválasztott parlament hozta meg formailag. Hasonlóan jött létre azon országgyűlés, mely az alkotmányrevíziót legalizálta. Tehát az okláncolat, a jogfolytonosság megtörik.

Egyetlen megoldás volt elképzelhető, mely a Szent Korona-tan elkötelezettjei, az emberi jogok nemzetköziségének hitvallói, a státus quo és a formai jogbiztonság hívei, valamint az elmúlt rendszer illegitimitását nem teljes meggyőződéssel vallók között kompromisszumos lehetőségként létezik. Nem csupán jogelméleti, hanem gyakorlati aspektusból is. (Ugyanis bármiféle rendezéshez elengedhetetlen, hogy kellő társadalmi támogatást és parlamenti szavazatot maga mögött tudjon.) Egy olyan alaptörvényt kellett alkotni, mely nem a rossz emlékű 1949-es évszámot viseli, viszont amiben nem muszáj, nem tért el a rendszerváltás utáni alkotmánytól. Preambulumában helyreállítja a jogfolytonosságot, azaz kontinuitást vállal a Történelmi Alkotmánnyal. Emellett viszont beemeli szövegszerűen az Alkotmánybíróság elmúlt 20 évi legfontosabb döntéseit és merít a világ alkotmányainak legbölcsebb rendelkezéseiből. Ilyen volt a hatalommegosztás eszméje, illetőleg az alapjogok korlátozása tekintetében a szükségességi és arányossági teszt. Így született meg Magyarország Alaptörvénye 2011-ben, amely saját értelmezési hátterének deklarálta a Történeti Alkotmány vívmányait. (Az Alkotmánybíróság a 33/2012. (VII. 7.) AB határozatban ez utóbbira alapozta döntését a bírói függetlenséggel kapcsolatban.)

Ha már írott alaptörvénnyel rendelkezünk, ildomos néhány olyan hasonló vezérelvet szövegszerűen is kodifikálni, melyek egykor a nemzet lelkébe ivódtak.

Az államformának igen nagy volt a jelentősége a Szent Korona-tan szerint, de nem mindenek fölött való. A korona ugyanis nem elsősorban az uralkodó, hanem az államiság jelképe. A király nélküli királyság időszakában Horthy Miklóst az államforma kérdésének bolygatása nélkül, a az uralkodás aspektusának ideiglenes rendezéséig választották kormányzóvá. Ennek ellenére rámutathatunk, a kormányforma kérdése sokkal fontosabb gyakorlati szempontból az államformánál. Alkotmányos monarchiákban az uralkodónak jóval csekélyebb a súlya, mint egy prezidenciális elnöknek, de talán még egy parlamentáris államfőénél is gyengébb. Érdekes, hogy a közgondolkodás a királyokat „örök uralkodónak”, míg egyéb államfőket korlátozott mandátumúnak véli; ezzel szemben Horthy kormányzó (egy módosítás folytán) élethossziglani mandátummal bírt, míg például Malajzia királyának megbízatása 5 éves ciklusokra szól.

A közelmúltban a parlament visszaállította a megyei kormánymegbízottak tekintetében a főispáni titulust, amely sokak részéről ellenkezést vagy értetlenséget váltott ki. Az ispáni, főispáni tisztség a Történeti Alkotmány szerint az egyik legfontosabb feladatkör volt, történelmi nagyjaink közül sokan viselték.[6] (Csak példálózva: Hunyadi János, a Rákócziak, Bercsényi Miklós, Andrássy Gyula.) Mai terminológiával a központi kormányzat embere volt, akit (a végrehajtó hatalom fejeként) a király, majd a kiegyezést követően a kormány nevezett ki. (Léteztek – egyes családokhoz tartozó – örökös főispánságok is, illetőleg az alispáni pozíció a mai rendszerhez viszonyítva a megyei közgyűlés elnökének felet meg. Pest megye főispánja tisztségénél fogva a nádor volt.) A Rákosi-rendszerben pedig teljesen illegitim módon törölték el a főispánságot, csupán azért, mert a nemzeti hagyományokkal gyökeresen szakítani akartak. Ezért már a rendszerváltás küldetése lett volna a titulus visszaállítása 1990-ben. Akkor ehhez a kétharmados felhatalmazás hiányzott, illetve voltak a nemzet számára égetőbben sürgős ügyek. Tegyük hozzá, a megyéket felügyelő központi tisztségviselőket más névvel lényegében reaktiválták, köztársasági megbízottak, majd közigazgatási hivatalvezetők lettek, illetőleg az új Alaptörvény rendszerében kormánymegbízottak. Utóbbi elnevezést sajnos még jogászok is összekeverhették a teljesen eltérő hatáskörű kormánybiztossal. Sok mai államban létezik analóg pozíció, utalhatunk itt a francia prefektusokra.

Nem tudom elfogadni azon érvet a titulus visszaállítása ellen, hogy számos főispán kompromittálódott a világháború borzalmai közepette. Ez ugyanis nem a tisztség, hanem ad absurdum a viselőjének lehet a bűne. Ilyen alapon egy kollaboráns rendszerben „a miniszter”, „az államtitkár”, „a polgármester” fogalma is lejáratódhat. Akkor ezeket a kifejezéseket sem lehet többet demokratikus rendszerben használni? Gondolhatunk a Kőszívű ember fiainak (történelmi gyökereken nyugvó) történetére, amelyben éppen a nemzeti hagyományokat megtestesítő főispánokat sírták vissza a megyék a császár által rájuk oktrojált adminisztrátorokkal szemben az 1840-es években.

Számos ország használja ma is a történelmi titulusokat. Persze főképpen a monarchiákra igaz ez. (Legfőképpen Nagy-Britanniára és a Lordok Házára utalhatunk.) Ám az is tény, hogy az államfői poszt a legtöbb helyen egy jelképes méltóság, az uralkodók hatáskörei ma a legtöbb államban nem különböznek egy parlamentáris köztársasági elnök hatásköreitől, mint ahogy az államok berendezkedése sem tér el érdemben. De például a köztársasági Lengyelország területi egységeinek vezetői a rendszerváltozás után is vajdák lettek.[7] Németország miniszterelnöke pedig ma is kancellár. Mint történelmi időkben is volt. De még Hitler kancellári tisztsége sem nyomta rá ezen elnevezésre ördögbélyegét. Amennyiben megtalálnánk modern analógiájukat jogállami tartalommal, felvetődhetne még egyéb történelmi tisztségek újabb használata is. (Például nádor, országbíró, tárnokmester.)

A történelmi örökség egyben hatalmas elvárás is. A mai főispánoknak dicső történelmi elődjeik erkölcsi tartását kell zsinórmértéknek tekinteniük.

Bibliográfia

Balogh Elemér: Alkotmányunk történetisége, kitekintéssel az Alkotmánybíróság judikatúrájára, in Balogh Elemér (szerk.): Számadás az Alaptörvényről, Szeged, Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft., 2016.

Barta Attila: A területi államigazgatási szervek jogállása és azok változásai Magyarországon, Doktori értekezés, Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem, 2012.

Bölöny József: Történelmi alkotmányunk és az 1848-as fejlődés, Budapest, Magyar Közigazgatás Könyvtára, 1941.

Fügedi Erik: Ispánok, bárók, kiskirályok, Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1986.

Holub József: A magyar alkotmánytörténelem vázlata, Pécs, Dunántúl Pécsi Egyetemi Könyvkiadó és Nyomda, 1944.

Horváth Attila: A Szentkorona Tan története, in Balázs Arató (szerk.): Jogalkotási tükör 2010–2018, Budapest, Patrocinium, 2018.

Zétényi Zsolt: A történeti alkotmány, Budapest, Magyarországért Kulturális Egyesület, 2010.

Hivatkozások

  1. Ld. Balogh Elemér: Alkotmányunk történetisége, kitekintéssel az Alkotmánybíróság judikatúrájára, in Balogh Elemér (szerk.): Számadás az Alaptörvényről, Szeged, Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft., 2016, 541–543.
  2. Zétényi Zsolt: A történeti alkotmány, Budapest, Magyarországért Kulturális Egyesület, 2010, ld. különösen 161–164.
  3. Vö. Horváth Attila: A Szentkorona Tan története, in Balázs Arató (szerk.): Jogalkotási tükör 2010–2018, Budapest, Patrocinium, 2018, 45–70.
  4. Holub József: A magyar alkotmánytörténelem vázlata, Pécs, Dunántúl Pécsi Egyetemi Könyvkiadó és Nyomda, 1944, 247–251.
  5. Vö. Bölöny József: Történelmi alkotmányunk és az 1848-as fejlődés, Budapest, Magyar Közigazgatás Könyvtára, 1941, 16.
  6. Korábban ispán volt a titulus, később lett főispán. Tömören összefoglalva a királyi vármegye, majd a nemesi vármegye élén állt. Részben összefüggött a várnagyi tisztséggel. A pozsonyi, szepesi, sárosi ispán egyetemleg a megyeközpont várának várnagyi tisztségét is viselte. Ld. Fügedi Erik: Ispánok, bárók, kiskirályok, Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1986, különösen 201.
  7. Barta Attila: A területi államigazgatási szervek jogállása és azok változásai Magyarországon, Doktori értekezés, Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem, 2012, 26.